Abstract. Among various cryptographic schemes, CBC-based MACs belong to the few ones most widely used in practice. Such MACs iterate a blockcipher EK in the so called Cipher-Block-Chaining way, i.e. Ci = EK (Mi ⊕ Ci−1) , offering high efficiency in practical applications. In the paper, we propose a new deterministic variant of CBC-based MACs that is provably secure beyond the birthday bound. The new MAC 3kf9 is obtained by combining f 9 (3GPP-MAC) and EMAC sharing the same internal structure, and so it is almost as efficient as the original CBC MAC. 3kf9 offers O(
Introduction

Background
Birthday Bound. In cryptography, birthday attack is a generic attack that exploits no specific properties within cryptographic schemes, but just takes the advantage of birthday paradox in probability theory. This paradox says, approximately 2 n/2 independently random n-bit points will collide with a probability close-to-1, where 2 n/2 is called the birthday bound [28, 20] . The birthday attack itself is not fatal to the practical security of cryptographic schemes, because people can choose long-enough security parameters to defend, e.g. by restricting the output length of hash functions to be no shorter than 224 bits [3] , or by preventing attackers from getting sufficient number of input-output pairs, to make this attack infeasible in recent years.
However, being constrained by some particular software/hardware environments, there still exist many actual applications using short security parameters. For example, the 64-bit blockcipher KASUMI is currently a standard algorithm in mobile communication systems [7] . With the rapid developments of Internet of Things, several lightweight primitives have been proposed in recent years, e.g. present and PHOTON [11, 14] . These algorithms take small-size internal states and output values, usually are much easier to be realized in software and require smaller area in hardware, offering better performance than normal-size ones. Unfortunately, their small sizes imply vulnerability when they are used with traditional modes of operation, most of which are only secure within the birthday bound [19, 2] . To ensure practical security in such cases, those modes have to be combined with stateful or random values, or to limit the lengths of their input messages, or to update secret keys frequently, resulting in inconveniences and security risks if misused.
MAC. Message Authentication Code is a widely-used cryptographic scheme for data integrity protection and data origin authentication. Practical applications usually require them to be not only secure (outputting unpredictable tags for new messages) but also efficient. A common way to design a MAC algorithm is to iterate a blockcipher E : K E ×{0, 1}
n → {0, 1} n in the Cipher-Block-Chaining (CBC) manner. That is, in each step, a new chaining value C i is obtained by encrypting the XOR result of the current message block M i and the previous chaining value C i−1 , i.e. C i = E K (M i ⊕ C i−1 ). The CBC structure is so common in the design of many cryptographic schemes that it has been considerably studied for many years [8, 27, 9, 16, 24] .
Up to now, many excellent CBC-based MACs have been proposed, e.g. EMAC, XCBC, OMAC, CMAC and GCBC [27, 9, 16, 4, 24] . Besides, PMAC takes a fully parallelizable construction and can offer extremely high speed in parallel environments [10] . All of the above MAC algorithms are deterministic (needing no stateful or random values), and provably secure when their underlying blockcipher is assumed to be a pseudorandom permutation (PRP). However, their security bounds all fall within the birthday bound, and can not be further improved because there exist birthday attacks on them, i.e. the birthday bound is tight for them [19, 2] .
There are also a few CBC-based MACs with provable security beyond the birthday bound. For example, RMAC replaces the second key in EMAC by XORing its first key and a random value [18, 2] , and MAC-R1 and MAC-R2 inject n-bit randomness into the internal states of CBC-based MACs [23] . Obviously, their high security relies on not only the PRP security of blockciphers but also the randomness of the injected values.
In fact, all the deterministic blockcipher-based MACs fall within the birthday bound until Yasuda shows algorithm 6 in the ISO standard is an exception, conditioned on some restrictions on messages [1, 30] . In the same paper, Yasuda also introduces SUM-ECBC to reduce the key size in algorithm 6, by XORing the results from two CBC-based MACs, providing half of the efficiency that normal CBC-based MACs offer in serial implementations (rate 2
3 ). On the other hand, Dodis and Steinberger build a MAC from unpredictable blockciphers, with security beyond the birthday bound, but pay by very high efficiency cost [12] . Very recently, Yasuda proposes PMAC Plus that improves PMAC beyond the birthday bound [31] . By pre-calculating sufficiently large number (as many as the number of message blocks) of masks, this MAC would provide high efficiency due to the fully parallelizable structure in PMAC and rate-1 design.
3GPP-MAC.
To promote the global system for mobile communications, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) proposes f9 as its first MAC algorithm, which is based on blockcipher KASUMI and produces 32-bit tags [6] . f 9 inherits the structure of original CBC MAC, but in the end encrypts the sum of all chaining values, other than the last chaining value, to obtain the tag. The analysis for f 9 tends to be tough due to this particular feature [17] . Knudsen and Mitchell are the first to give birthday attacks on f 9, which need 2
known (Message, MAC) pairs and 2 n/2+1 chosen (Message, MAC) pairs to make a forgery against f 9 without truncations [20] . Then, Iwata and Kohno proved that when KASUMI is secure against a special kind of related-key attacks (RK-PRP), a generalized version of f 9 (named with f 9 ′ ) is PRF-secure within the birthday bound [15] . This implies the previous birthday attack is the best one without knowledge of internal information.
Despite the fact that the birthday attacks on MACs need on-line invocations, making it much more harder than those on hash functions (needing only offline computations), people still take several countermeasures for large enough security margin. For example, in the practical applications of f 9, it has been demanded that each message should be prepended with a fresh value, the length of messages should be no longer than 20000 bits, the secret key should be changed after each invocation, and the outputs should be truncated [5, 6] .
Our Work
In this paper, we attempt to design a rate-1 CBC-based MAC with provable security beyond the birthday bound. A direct application of such a scheme is to enforce the security level of current CBC-based MACs, especially in the situations where small-size (lightweight) blockciphers are used, e.g. 3GPP and smart cards. Another application is to make it serve as a highly-secure pseudorandom number generator for various protocols, which therefore would improve the security level of the latter.
To do this, stateful or random values (e.g. counter, fresh) can help, but we would not consider them for practical convenience. Another possible way is to enlarge the size of internal states but still output normal-size tags. As for CBC-based MACs, however, their internal states have the same size as their underlying blockcipher, so one may want to use a large-size blockcipher in CBCbased MACs and truncate their outputs. Unfortunately, the efficiency of such a solution will not be satisfying, because a large-size blockcipher usually runs no faster than a small-size one, not to mention many other costs, e.g. memory and area requirements.
Our starting point is f 9, in favor of its double-blocksize internal states providing a possible chance to resist the birthday attacks. Inspired by the design of SUM-ECBC and PMAC Plus, we append one more blockcipher invocation to the end of the f 9 structure, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . The resulting MAC is named with 3kf9, for it enhances f 9 and needs three independent keys. From another point of view, it is also an extension of EMAC [27] , ignoring E K3 and the last XOR operation.
Fig. 1. Illustration of 3kf9
When authenticating messages, 3kf9 can start to work without stateful values or message length information (on-line), requires no pre-computation and only two block-size memory for internal states, besides those for its underlying blockcipher. Specially, it needs no multiplications, comparing with PMAC Plus. Therefore, 3kf9 will provide high efficiency in serial implementations.
A more detailed comparison with related MACs is given in Table 1 . 
[27] a bBB stands for "beyond the Birthday Bound". b It has been removed from the latest version ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011. c Its second key is obtained by K2 = K1 ⊕ KM, where KM is a non-zero k-bit value.
Organization.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces necessary symbols and 3kf9 specification. Section 3 gives our provable security analysis for 3kf9, including security definitions, the main result and its proof. The proof will be completed in Section 4. In Section 5, we give some suggestions for practical usages of 3kf9. Finally, we conclude this work in Section 6.
Symbols and Specification
{0, 1}
n is the set of all n-bit strings and {0, 1} * is the set of all strings. For strings a, b ∈ {0, 1} * , a||b is a concatenation of a and b, and |a| is its length in bits. If a, b have equal lengths then a ⊕ b is their bitwise XOR. Denote Perm(n) and Rand(n, n) as the sets of all permutations and functions over {0, 1} n respectively. Rand( * , n) stands for the set of all functions whose range belongs to {0, 1}
n . If A is a set, then #A denotes the size of set A, and x $ ← A means that x is chosen from set A uniformly at random.
A message M can be alternatively seen as a bit string
n−1−|M | mod n we mean we append a single bit "1" to the end of M , followed by as many as n − 1 − |M | mod n bit "0"s such that the length of the padded string is a multiple of n. For any such string
MAC Algorithm 3kf9[E]
Input: K1, K2, K3
Fig. 2. Specification of 3kf9
For any message M ∈ {0, 1} * , 3kf9 takes a blockcipher E :
n as its underlying primitive, calling it iteratively as specified in Fig. 2 to deal with M , and finally outputs T ∈ {0, 1} n as a tag. If necessary, T can be truncated to be of some particular length less than n.
3kf9 needs three keys K 1 , K 2 and K 3 , each of which should be independently selected from K = K E uniformly at random. We use 3kf9[E K1 , E K2 , E K3 ] to stand for this MAC algorithm and we also write it as 3kf9[E] for short.
Security Proof
Security Definitions
W need to introduce PRP/PRF definitions here, which are frequently used in the analysis of modes of operation for blockciphers [8, 27, 9, 16, 24] .
These two definitions focus on the randomness of a keyed function f K , which is selected from a function family f :
n by selecting a random key K. To measure its randomness, f K is compared with a random
The comparison is done as, informally, allowing adversaries (without knowing K) to query an oracle, which is either f K or R with equal probability. The oracle will answer with the corresponding outputs. After some number of queries, the adversaries are asked to tell what the oracle is. The precise definition is given by
and the maximum is over all adversaries taking time at most t, making oracle queries at most q, whose total length is at most µ bits. If Adv , µ) ) is sufficiently small, we say function family f is a pseudorandom function (PRF) (or a pseudorandom permutation (PRP)).
It has been proved that a PRF is a secure MAC [8] .
Main Results
Let 3kf9[P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ] stand for 3kf9[E K1 , E K2 , E K3 ] when blockcipher E with three independent keys are replaced by three independently random permutations P 1 , P 2 and P 3 , and we further write it as 3kf9[P ] for simplicity. Then, the following theorem says that 3kf9[P ] is a PRF with an upper bound beyond the birthday bound.
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem). For any computationally unbounded adversary
A, after querying the oracle q times, with each query no longer than l max blocks,
We conclude this theorem by the "coefficient H technique" initially proposed by Patarin [25, 26] . This method is a useful tool for proving pseudorandom properties of blockcipher structures and modes of operation, and it has been frequently used before [25, 13, 16, 24] .
To simplify our proof, we also adopt the framework used in the proofs for SUM-ECBC and PMAC Plus [30, 31] , which separates the inputs to P 2 and P 3 into four cases. Taking advantage of some known results for CBC structure, f 9 and sum of PRPs [9, 15, 22] , the first three cases can be easily upper bounded. For the last case, we prove it by Lemma 1 in the next section.
Proof. Since A is computationally unbounded, w.l.o.g. we assume A is a deterministic algorithm, otherwise we can maximize A by running it over all possible cases and choose the most powerful one. Based on this, the i-th query
, we know -all A's queries are uniquely determined, -the number of queries q is uniquely determined, and -the output of A (0 or 1) is uniquely determined. 
Evaluation for 3kf9 [P ] .
Denote CBC[P 1 ] as the internal structure of 3kf9 Fig. 1 . In the following analysis, we do step by step for each i = 1, 2, · · · , q. Suppose in the previous i − 1 queries, the i−1 outputs For Case A, Black and Rogaway have shown that the probability for any two messages to collide in CBC structure (with an independent ending blockcipher invocation, e.g. EMAC, ECBC) is upper bounded by the birthday bound, i.e.
(See Lemma 3 in [9] ). In such a case, we still have randomness for 
For Case B, Iwata and Kohno have pointed out that the probability for any two messages to collide in f 9 (with an independent ending block cipher invocation) is also upper bounded by the birthday bound, i.e. Pr[
(See Lemma B.1 in [15] , and note that we apply σ ≤ 2l max + 2 and q = 2 here). Then, by lazy sampling for P 2 (Q i ), we know the advantage to distinguish T i from r is upper bounded by
For Case C, Lucks has proved that the advantage to distinguish
(See the proof for Theorem 5 in [22] 
by applying it to inequality (1).
Comparison.
By the above analysis, we can get
On the other side, if we define Tset 0 and by similar analysis we can get 
where
, and µ ′ ≤ µ + qn.
Key Lemma
The none occurrence of Case D implies the q pairs (Q i , S i ) (i = 1, 2, · · · , q) are free. By "free", we mean for each i ∈ [1, q] , either Q i is unique in its corresponding sequence
This property is closely related to the newly appeared Cover Free notion [12] , which says the q outputs (N 
To do this, we check the process detail of CBC[P 1 ] in dealing with the querying messages 
Proof. For any q pairwise distinct queries
we use a program to show the process of CBC[P 1 ] in dealing with them, as in Fig. 3 . To better analyze the target probability, we do lazy sampling for P 1 . Furthermore, we denote three flags Zero, Cover and Bad. Zero is used to identify whether there exists Y i l = 0 n , which may be easily used to undermine the freeness consistence of (Y Then, it is easy to get that Pr
, because for the q messages whose length is no more than l max + 1 blocks after being padded, we do no more than q(l max + 1) lazy sampling for P 1 ,
if Y i l ∈ YRange and S i l ∈ SRange and 13.
end if 17. end for 
On the other hand, the elements in SRange are 
Where we apply #Range[ 
⊕ Y ⊕M can be calculated by the previous pairs and queries), so the probability in (2) can be separated, thus we obtain inequality (3).
In this most common case, the probability for lazy sampling
n \ Range[P 1 ] to undermine the freeness consistence is at most
Generalized Case 1.
The above lazy sampling may further induce the occurrence of event [X i l+2 ∈ Domain[P 1 ]], so the previous analysis is not complete, and here we generalize it in this direction.
Suppose
, let us consider the probability to undermine the freeness consistence. First, we have Pr[ equations, and each has a probability of 1/2 n−1 to occur, with similar reasons given in the most common case. So, here the probability for this lazy sampling to keep freeness consistence is upper bounded by
). Notice that u is the number of invocations to
Generalized Case 2.
Since we assume adversaries can make any q pairwise distinct queries
q , it is possible that some queries share a common prefix. Here we generalize the probability for lazy sampling equations, with probability 1/2 n−1 to occur each. Then it is not hard to get the probability to keep freeness consistence in this case is no more than 
The Most General Case.
Based on the above, we generalize the most common case in two directions, as in Generalized case 1 and 2. The analysis here is the same as that in Generalized case 2, until Y
Conclusion
We propose a rate-1 CBC-based MAC 3kf9 with provable security beyond the birthday bound in this paper. 3kf9 is efficient for its rate-1 design, and highlysecure for its O( l 3 q 3 2 2n + lq 2 n ) PRF bound. Moreover, 3kf9 is light in the sense that it needs only XOR operations besides blockcipher invocations, and thus it immediately turns into a lightweight MAC when equipped with a lightwight blockcipher. However, its key size seems to be too large in some particular environments, requiring further improvements therefore.
